Will Kerry’s Middle East talks lead to peace?

In an undisclosed location in Jerusalem, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were back at the table this week, under the watchful eye of United States Secretary of State John Kerry. Though both sides appear somewhat reluctant, the US has applied considerable pressure to restart the negotiations.

Could it mean peace at last? Will a compromise be found where Palestinians get their rights and Israelis get the security they so desire? Or should we join the many pessimists who predict that, once again, the negotiations will lead to naught?

What’s the US interest in kick-starting talks?

Since taking office last winter, Kerry has made six trips to the Middle East, repeatedly visiting Jerusalem and Ramallah as well as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Given that there is so much turmoil elsewhere in the Arab world, why is US President Barack Obama’s top foreign policy man spending so much time on Israel/Palestine, which has been relatively quiet?

The high priority is no doubt related to the Obama government’s recognition that its ability to influence events in the Middle East is weakening. After many years in which it was able to count on authoritarian monarchies or military strong men, America finds it has a declining ability to control a region that has become much more unstable. In this context, many American policy-makers feel that it has to show that a US-brokered “deal” between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization is in the works.

“Israeli-Palestinian peace is surely not the key to a stable Middle East,” argued Aaron David Miller recently in The Washington Post. “But if serious progress were made, and even a partial agreement reached, it would significantly improve America’s image, [and] help protect its interests.” Mr. Miller served as a negotiator for Republican and Democratic secretaries of state from 1978 to 2003.

In senior US policy circles, including at the Pentagon, there is concern that anti-American sentiment is growing in the region, and America’s allies will be under increasing pressure to distance themselves from the US, unless progress can be seen in resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Obama, in other words, has to get out in front of this issue or risk losing control. What is important to the US is that there be an appearance of progress. As long as there seems to be some progress, other initiatives—like the recent European Union decision on restricting goods from the illegal settlements, or the option of bringing the issue back to the United Nations General Assembly in September—can be headed off as “jeopardizing the peace process.”

Obama’s bottom line

In an ideal mediation process the mediator has no preference for either of the parties and no preferred outcome in mind. Of course, complete neutrality as a mediator is rarely possible, and in this case the US preference for Israel is widely understood.

What is exceptional, however, is that in this file the “mediator” actually has a bottom line. Obama knows that any US-brokered deal must be acceptable to Congress, which at this time means that it is acceptable to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the most important pro-Israel lobby group in the US.

With this in mind, Obama has named Martin Indyk, a former US ambassador to Israel (and former AIPAC deputy research director) as the head of the US negotiating team.

According to Michael Bell, Canada’s former ambassador to both Israel and Egypt, Indyk actually sent a “letter of assurance” to both sides outlining Obama’s bottom line. The contents are not public, but according to the usually well-informed Bell, they almost surely include the following:

• Accepting the 1967 border as a basis for discussion (as opposed to the borders the UN proposed for Israel in 1947, or today’s de facto borders created by Israel’s “separation barrier,” for example). This means that the Palestinian starting point would be on only 22 per cent of the original historic Palestine, which also happens to be among the driest and least productive land of old Palestine.

• Accepting the notion of “land swaps,” which effectively means that many of Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem will become legal.

• Giving up (or putting off indefinitely) any notion of a right for the 4.7 million Palestinian refugees to return to Israel. About half of the total Palestinian population remains huddled in refugee camps on Israel’s periphery. They could be allowed to “return” to the West Bank, of course, but not to their homes and villages inside Israel.

• Accepting the notion of Israel as a Jewish state. Accepting it means that, by law, Israel would have the right to treat its Palestinian citizens (20 per cent of the Israeli population) as second-class citizens.

Obama’s clear bottom line means that the US is actually one of the interested parties rather than a mediator. In fact, it would be closer to the truth to say that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas faces two negotiators: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (the bad cop) and Obama (the good cop).

If the cards are so stacked against him, why would Abbas agree to talks?

President Abbas and the PLO leadership are of course very aware that a deal along Obama’s lines would be unacceptable to many Palestinians. As a result, it’s a good bet that he was very reluctant to come to the table at all. But Abbas is under severe pressure to do so from different sources.

According to Ambassador Bell, Obama threatened to cut off US aid for the Palestinian Authority unless Abbas returned to the table. The resulting loss of hundreds of millions of US dollars would have probably meant the collapse of his administration.

Other Arab leaders are also pressuring Abbas. Rocked by the Arab Spring, they are all under considerable internal pressure to show more support to the Palestinians. An Israeli-Palestinian deal—or even a semblance of progress in negotiations—would make life easier for them.

Abbas also faces internal pressures. A small but influential business class in the West Bank is attracted by Kerry’s highly publicized promise of huge investments in tourism and high-tech in the new state of Palestine. And, of course, the thousands of Palestinian families who have relatives in Israeli prisons, hope that the recent release of 26 Palestinian prisoners will be followed by other releases as the negotiation process proceeds.

Finally, as long as the US can present the negotiations as credible, how can Abbas resist coming to the table? He knows the Israelis and Americans will paint him as a refusenik should he decline to even start negotiations.

So Abbas appears boxed in. He has to come to the table, and has to appear willing to do so, even if in his heart he knows this is not likely to come to any good.

So should we be happy Kerry has got Abbas and Netanyahu to come to the table, or not?

Today, both Abbas and Netanyahu probably wish they were somewhere else.

Abbas knows the only deal that will satisfy Obama will make him a pariah amongst many of his own people. Netanyahu feels that Israel is strong enough that it doesn’t need to sign a deal, and can continue to gobble up Palestinian land without significant international opposition.

As a result, the chances of coming to a deal in the nine-month timeframe set out by Obama are rather small. It’s more likely that everybody will play for time, and the US will allow them to do so as long as the process continues to appear credible.

Like many others, I look forward to a real peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. However, a careful analysis of the interests of the various players would seem to indicate that the deal that Kerry and Obama are trying to force on Abbas is not one that will bring justice to most Palestinians. If it doesn’t bring justice to the Palestinians, it probably won’t bring security to the Israelis either.

About the Author

Peter Larson

Peter Larson is chair of the National Education Committee on Israel/Palestine with the National Council on Canada Arab Relations.

Posted on August 22, 2013